The Fighting At Atlanta

By remaining on the defensive, the Confederates might have held the city for months. But their new commander chose to attack the larger Federal army in three separate engagements which cost precious manpower and gained nothing. This is the story of Peachtree Creek, the Battle of Atlanta, Ezra Church, and Jonesboro.

ON  JULY  5,   1864,  the  Federal armies of the  Cumberland,  the Ohio, and the Tennessee, under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, approached   the   Chattahoochee River northwest of Atlanta, hop­ing to find that their opponent, Gen. Joseph E.   Johnston, had  already crossed it with his Confederate Army of Tennessee. But they found  their paths blocked  by  strong  fortifications  on  high ground near the river. A bloody repulse at Kennesaw  Mountain,  eight days  earlier, had made Sherman wary of attacking Confederate forts. To bypass Johnston's "river line" he sent his  seven  army corps upstream,  to cross  at points bevond Johnston's right.

Atlanta was protected by almost 12 miles of fortifications into which   the Confederates could retire, but Johnston had other plans.  Midway between  those forts and Peachtree Creek he was building an outer line overlooking the valley of Peachtree Creek. When Sherman's Right wing, Thomas, was busy crossing the creek, Johnston intended to send Hardee's  and Stewart's  (formerly Polk's) corps forward   from   this   outer   line   to attack the Cumberlanders before they could get ready to fight. The left wing, under McPherson, was too far away to help and Schofield was beyond recall.

Northeast of Atlanta the outer line turned south along the present Highland Avenue. Hood's corps was to stop McPherson as he approached there. Wheeler's cavalry would extend the line on Hood's right. Wheeler was to hold a high, bald hill (later called Leggett's Hill) from which Federal guns could shell downtown Atlanta.

But Johnston did not remain to execute his plans. On July 17 he was relieved from command and Gen. John B. Hood replaced him. The change was not popular with the army.

Hardee had crossed the river at Bolton and gone into bivouac to picket the river. On the 18th he marched his corps into Atlanta on the Marietta road, past Johnston's headquarters. The men had learned that he was leaving, and a feeling of despondency settled down on them. In moody silence they reached today's Five Points and turned north up Peachtree Street (Road). When they reached the outer line, where Peachtree and Spring Streets join, they deployed along it and entrenched. Hardee had three of his four divisions in line: Walker was in the center; Maney was on his left, with his left at Tanyard Branch; Bate's line, on Walker's right, ran to Clear Creek; his fourth division, Cleburne's, was in reserve behind Walker.

Stewart moved from the river into the outer line with his three divisions, Loring on the right, next to Maney, Walthall in the center, and French on the left, west of Howell Mill Road.

Following Johnston's plan, Hood on July 20 made a sortie against the advancing Federals. About 4 p.m., four hours later than Hood had planned, Hardee and Stewart moved to the attack. Along Hardee's front, Walker was astride the Peachtree (Buckhead) Road, Bate was in the Clear Creek valley, and Maney connected with Stewart's right in the valley of Tanyard Branch. Uncleared forests and dense thickets made it difficult to keep in line.

As Loring's division approached the high ground on which the Collier Road led from Peachtree to Collier's Mill, on Tanyard Branch, and then to the Howell Mill Road at the Embry plantation, it had to cross low, cleared ground. Walthall, on Loring's left, advanced over wooded hills. The right of Scott's brigade, next to Walthall's right, moved from the woods to the low ground where Tanyard Branch flowed placidly to the mill. On Walthall's left, French extended toward the mouth of Peachtree Creek, facing Palmer's XIV Corps across the creek.

Hood's delay gave Thomas time to get across the creek and advance to the high ground at Collier Road. Hooker's XX Corps-Williams', Geary's, and Ward's divi­sions-crossed at Peachtree Road and at the present Northside Drive. Earlier, Newton's division of Howard's IV Corps had crossed at Peachtree Road and moved for­ward to a high ridge just north of Collier Road. Here Newton deployed his men, with Kimball's brigade west of the road and Blake's (Wagner's) east of it. Good-speed's battery took position on the road. Bradley's brigade was in reserve, a few hundred yards in the rear.

Geary's division moved up to high ground along Collier Road, just west of the mill, with Williams in his right rear; but Ward's division, between Geary and Newton, was slower in getting across the creek and into position. The resulting gap left Newton dangerously exposed, but he had time to erect barricades and do some digging.

Walker's attack met with deadly fire from Newton's barricaded men. Brig. Gen. C. H. Stevens was killed, and his men strove to avenge him. Although hard pressed, Newton held his ground until Walker was forced to re­tire to reform his shattered line.

Bate managed to work around the left of Newton's line, over low, swampy ground and through tangles of small growth, and attacked his left rear. But Bradley's brigade quickly formed line of battle along the road, which overlooked Clear Creek. While Bradley's muskets took toll along Bate's front, a storm of canister and case decimated his ranks from guns posted across Peachtree Creek, on his right. He was forced to retire.

On Newton's refused right, Loring's men charged into the gap created by Ward's delay and threatened to en­gulf Kimball. But Kimball's regiments held firm until Ward could come up and drive Loring back. One of these embattled regiments, the 24th Wisconsin, was commanded by a boy major, Arthur MacArthur, whose son, Douglas, would later win renown.

On Loring's left, a terrible struggle was taking place at Collier's Mill. Scott's brigade, after routing Geary's skirmishers and capturing the 33d New Jersey's state flag, charged into the gap where Tanyard Branch cuts through the ridge by the mill. Col. Benjamin Harrison's brigade, of Ward's division, occupied the higher ground on each side. A battery was sited to sweep the approach. Scott's men were raked with canister and swept by storms of musket fire from the right and left. Finally they drew back, leaving the ground around the mill thickly carpeted with dead and wounded.

Walthall's men charged across the Embry plantation and into a long, deep ravine to assault Williams' line, posted on the high ground beyond. Although Reynolds' brigade, near the Howell Mill Road, met with some success, enfilading fire from its left forced it back. O'Neal's (Cantey's) brigade, on Reynolds' right, plunged into a section of the ravine between Geary's right and Williams' left, where it suffered heavily from a withering crossfire and was forced to withdraw.

At dark Hardee and Stewart pulled back their beaten men to the outer line. They had lost 4,796 in killed, wounded, and missing. Thomas had lost 1,779. Hood's first sortie had failed. He was not present.

While the Battle of Peachtree Creek raged north of Atlanta, there was also fighting to the east. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee was approaching Atlanta from Decatur. Logan's corps was astride the Georgia Railroad, with Dodge following in reserve. On Logan's left, south of the railroad. Blair moved southwest toward the Bald Hill which Wheeler was defending, and the Flat Shoals Road. Farther to the north. Cheatham's corps (Hood's) was holding back the advance of Schofield's XXIII Corps and Stanley's and Wood's divisions of Howard's IV Corps. Although Cheatham had no difficulty. the pressure on Wheeler grew too great for his dismounted cavalry force. In the late afternoon. Cleburne s division, Hardee's only reserve, was ordered to march to his relief. After a long. hot march, Cleburne relieved Wheeler at midnight.

On the 21st, fighting was suspended along all but Blair's line fronting the Bald Hill. But Cleburne was attacked by Leggett's division of Blair's corps, supported by Gresham's division under Giles A. Smith, with a fury which Cleburne later described as "the bitterest fighting" of his life. Finally, Cleburne's men were driven from the hill by Leggett, whose name the hill now bears. The intrenchments were at once reversed and Atlanta lay within range of Leggett's guns.

HOOD COUNTERED with a move that could have spelled disaster to McPherson's forces, whose left flank had no cavalry screen. He decided to send Hardee's corps on a 15-mile night march to McPherson's rear; a well-placed attack there promised better results than the head-on assault at Peachtree Creek. The ensuing conflict, known as the Battle of Atlanta, is dramatically portrayed on the 400-foot canvas of the Atlanta Cyclorama now housed in a special building in the city's Grant Park.

Hood instructed Hardee to move his corps south through Atlanta that night, swing around to the south­east, and then turn north toward Decatur to strike the rear of McPherson's line. Although the route followed strange roads, Hood expected Hardee to be in position by daylight of the 22d to deliver a surprise attack upon the unsuspecting Federals.

Hardee's march began at dark. Cleburne's division, which had been pulled back into Atlanta after fighting all day, joined the column as it passed through the city. The night was hot and the roads ankle deep in dust. The men slogged along wearily, many of them with empty canteens.

At daybreak Hardee was still far from his destination. Since the country was strange to his officers and he had no maps, he secured two guides. Close to East Atlanta the road forked. Hardee sent Walker's and Bate's divi­sions up the Fayetteville Road toward Decatur, as Hood had planned. But he sent Cleburne's and Maney's divi­sions straight ahead toward the Federal left flank.

A short distance farther north the road crossed Sugar Creek. Here Walker halted and decided to turn left, up the creek. In vain his guide, Case Turner, argued that he would be blocked by the large pond at Terry's Mill, but Walker was adamant. He turned and, with Bate following, was soon confronted by the pond. The ensuing confusion attracted unwelcome attention. It was now almost noon, and neither wing of Hardee's corps was where Hood wanted it-behind the Federal line.

During the forenoon, McPherson had ridden to Sherman's field headquarters at the Augustus Hurt (Howard) house, east of Atlanta. He asked that Sweeney's division of Dodge's corps, in reserve behind Logan, be sent across Sugar Creek to fill a gap between the refused left of Blair's XVII Corps and Fuller's division of Dodge's corps, on the extreme left, both of which faced south. In the absence of Garrard's cavalry, which had gone eastward to destroy the rails and bridges near Covington, Sweeney's division would be a welcome addition to that exposed exank. Sherman assented. It was a fortunate decision, for Sweeney's move toward the gap placed his division in position to block Walker and Bate.

Sherman then explained a plan to shift McPherson from the left of the army to the right. On a map, he indicated the line of march. The route would take McPherson behind Schofield's   Army of the Ohio and Thomas' Army of the Cumberland, and put him in position to reach for the two railroads which entered Atlanta through East Point, the Macon & Western, and the Atlanta & West Point. With the Georgia Railroad and the Western & Atlantic in Sherman's hands, Hood de­pended upon these two roads to supply his army, par­ticularly the Macon & Western.

When Sherman had finished, McPherson rode back to inspect his lines-and to meet his death early in the afternoon.

About noon, Sweeney was moving toward the gap when he halted briefly. He was near Fuller, who had pickets out to his front and left and artillery posted on a hill near where Sweeney had halted. These pickets had been alerted by the confusion at the millpond, and as Walker got clear of the pond and started to ride farther north he was killed. Brig. Gen. Hugh W. Mercer took command of his division. Immediately Bate and Mercer hurried into position but only Bate, on Mercer's right, actually reached a point behind McPherson's line. As they moved forward, they found Sweeney's men formed to meet them. The Battle of Atlanta had begun.

Near Blair's refused left flank, Cleburne had deployed astride the Flat Shoals Road with his right brigade reaching beyond the gap to Fuller's right. Maney de­ployed on his left. As Cleburne moved forward to attack Blair and Fuller, Maney swung around and attacked Blair's front. Giles Smith's division was swept back upon Leggett's Hill.

When the firing commenced, McPherson galloped to a hill from which he could see the field. He watched Sweeney-on advantageous ground-repulse Walker and Mercer, then hurried to the sound of Giles Smith's disaster.

As Cleburne's right struck Fuller's left, skirmishers pressing forward through the gap saw a Federal general galloping toward them, accompanied only by an orderly. At their cry to halt, he wheeled his horse and attempted to escape. But a shot toppled McPherson from his saddle.

Cheatham's corps had been shifted to the right to attack McPherson's front. Had Hood launched it as Hardee struck the Federal left and rear, his second sortie might have succeeded in wrecking McPherson's army. But again, Hood was not on the battlefield, so Cheatham's attack was delayed. Blair's men reformed on Leggett's left, facing south, and that flank was secured.

Late in the afternoon Cheatham's attack finally got away. It struck M. L. Smith's division of the XV Corps, astride the railroad on the former Confederate outer line, broke Lightburn's brigade at the Troup Hurt house, and captured DeGress' battery of 20-pounder Parrott guns.

Logan, who had succeeded McPherson temporarily, promptly ordered forward Mersey's brigade of Swceney's division. Mersey's men double-quicked to the scene and, with Smith's reformed brigades, drove back Cheatham's embattled men and restored the Federal line.

When night finally closed the battle, Hood had lost more than 8,000 men. Sherman had lost 3,722. Again Hood had failed.

ON JULY 26, Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard was assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee. Maj. Gen. D. S. Stanley assumed command of the IV Corps. Already Howard's new command was en route to the right of the army, as Sherman had planned. By the 28th Dodge was in position on Thomas' right, facing Atlanta, and Logan and Blair had moved beyond him to the vicinity of Ezra Church, in the present Mozley Park, southwest of Atlanta toward East Point.

Stung by his failures, Hood watched Howard's move­ment, which threatened his remaining railroads. Deter­mined to halt it, he sent Stewart's and S. D. Lee's (Cheatham's) corps against the encircling enemy. The resulting Battle of Ezra Church was a third disaster.

Feeling carefully toward East Point, Howard halted on good defensive ground near the church. Increased cavalry resistance in his front warned him that Hood was aware of his movement. It was a fortunate decision.

Howard's skirmishers found enemy forces approach­ing on the Lickskillet (Gordon) Road. He deployed quickly, with Logan on the right and Blair on the left. Blair's line was sharply refused to face southeast, making a sharp angle where the two corps joined in front of Ezra Church. Hasty barricades were erected and Logan and Blair awaited the coming storm.

When S. D. Lee's corps arrived, it was deployed facing the XV Corps line. Brown's (Hindman's) division was placed on the left, opposite the right of Logan's line. Clayton's (Stewart's) division moved to his right. Brown had reached the field ahead of his troops and met Brig. Gen. William H. Jackson, whose cavalry division had been pressed back by Howard's advance. Jackson offered the opinion, however, that the Federal infantry did not appear to be in great force.

Lee's plan was to strike the Federal right flank and roll it back on its left, at Ezra Church. Moving out to the left, to insure a direct blow on Logan's right flank, Brown advanced with three brigades abreast and one in reserve. About 12:30 p.m., his skirmishers pushed for­ward through dense undergrowth and engaged Federal skirmishers on the Lickskillet Road. Brown's line moved forward, but fences and thickets disrupted his alignment and slowed his advance. He was forced to halt, under fire from the enemy skirmishers. When he advanced again, he drove the skirmishers back into Logan's line. But as he nearecl it, a withering fire proved Jackson's opinion wrong. After a desperate struggle, Brown was forced to retire.

Ten minutes after Brown moved forward, Clayton advanced. A misunderstanding caused Gibson's brigade to move unsupported against Logan's left. When the defenders saw but one brigade approaching, they swarmed out of their works and shattered Gibson's regiments. Clayton's  attempt  to  reinforce  him was  useless.His division, too, was driven back.

It was now 2 o'clock and Lee's attack thus far had failed. But the battle was not over; Stewart's troops were arriving. Walthall's division came first, and deployed in the interval between Brown's and Clayton's shattered remnants. Ordered to retrieve Brown's failure to drive Logan's right from its secure position and back upon his left. Walthall advanced over the same ground that Brown had traversed, his men stumbling over gruesome evidence of the fate of Brown's assault. The dead lay in ominous numbers, and the wounded cried piteously for water.  But Walthall, too, failed, and his dead  and wounded  lay  intermingled with Brown's.

Loring was wounded while deploying his division for an assault.   Before   Stewart   could   give   the   order   for Walthall  to retire, he was struck in the forehead by a spent bullet. Although Stewart had ordered Loring into the fight,   Walthall   took   command   when   Stewart  was wounded   and ordered no further assaults. The losses were  appalling-and   the  men's  lives  had  been spent in vain.

 From four o'clock until dark  the action was limited to

skirmishing. At 10 o'clock, the shattered ranks of Lee's and  Stewart's  corps  moved  back  to  the  shelter of  the fortifications.

The burden of the battle now had fallen upon Lee's corps  and Walthall's division of Stewart's. Despite their crushing defeat, all had fought with the fury of desperation.

The enemy testified  to their valor. Col. James S. Martin, 111th   Illinois Infantry, stated that the battle "for severity is unsurpassed by any of the campaign." Lt. Col. Samuel R. Mott, 57th Ohio Infantry, wrote that "the carnage was fearful and the dead and wounded on the field told a tale that must clothe many hearth stones in mourning and sorrow."

But the words of a tired Confederate soldier were the most eloquent of all. In the early dark, one of the skirmishers whom Logan had sent forward again called out-"Well, Johnny, how many of you are left?" The voice that answered might have been speaking for the dying cause:

"Oh, about enough for another killing."

When the losses at Ezra Church were tallied, Hood had lost approximately 5,000 of his remaining men. Sherman had lost 600. And again, Hood had not ap­peared on the battlefield. Hood had supplanted Johnston because he was a "fighter." He had fought, but the re­sults were to shock even the authorities in Richmond, who had been impatient with Johnston's sensible-but less colorful-policy of preserving his men for the task of holding Atlanta so long as it needed to be held. Now, to the humiliation of three failures was added an admoni­tion from President Davis to avoid attacking the enemy in his entrenchments. With his decimated and dispirited army, Hood faced the dull prospect of conducting a de­fense. But he soon learned that Sherman was not content with besieging the city. Hood found himself forced to fight for the possession of his railroads.

SHERMAN had found that the fortifications of Atlanta were too strong to assault and too extensive to encircle. Instead of attempting either, he occupied a line facing the city, with his left near the Georgia Railroad and his right probing toward East Point and Hood's vital railroads. His probing forced Hood to extend his own lines to cover East Point.

Meanwhile, Sherman subjected the city to continual shelling. Until August 9, the shelling had been moderate. As his impatience mounted, he had siege guns sent for­ward. These, together with 50 batteries of field pieces, all emplaced on commanding ground, fired by day and by night. But 30 days of persistent hammering produced no visible results. Hood continued to receive supplies, and spies reported no shortages of food or munitions. The citizens went about their affairs with seeming in­difference to the bursting shells. Although most of the families had "refugeed," those remaining lived in cellars, and in caves and "bomb proofs" constructed in their yards and gardens. It appeared that Atlanta would, as Johnston had confidently intended, be held "forever."

As August wore on, the opposing lines crept slowly toward East Point, Hood's finally encircling the town. Continual skirmishing, sometimes amounting to sharp engagements, marked each passing day. On the Sandtown (Cascade) Road, near the south fork of Utoy Creek, a repulse by Bate's division of an attempt by Schofield to break his line resulted in the Battle of Utoy Creek. But on the morning of the 26th the defenders found the trenches opposite them empty. Sherman was gone.

In many places the siege lines were plainly visible from the city parapets. As watchers beheld the empty works, rumors flew thick and fast. Although Hood had sent most of his cavalry on a fruit­less raid to break Sherman's supply line, Jackson had remained. He reported to Hood that Sherman's columns were moving south. Con­vinced that his cavalry had interrupted Sherman's supplies and forced him to retreat, Hood concluded that he was crossing the Chattahoochee River at Campbellton ferry. He relaxed his vigilance.

While shelling Atlanta and probing Hood's lines toward East Point, Sherman had been planning a turning movement around Hood's left to break his railroads. Had Johnston remained in com­mand, his watchfulness, together with the striking power of his intact army, would have made the move hazardous. But neither the depleted army which remained, nor its general, now deterred Sherman.

On the night of the 25th the XX Corps moved back to the Chattahoochee River at Bolton, to cover and protect the railroad and Turner's and Pace's ferries. Through the night, the other corps passed to the right and rear, toward Lickskillet (Adamsville) and Mt. Gilead Church. But not until the blue columns had destroyed the Atlanta & West Point Railroad at Red Oak and Fan burn, was Hood convinced that a "raid" was directed at Jonesboro, as cavalry reports had indicated. But he still refused to believe that Sherman was moving on Jonesboro in force.

On the 30th Hood was finally satisfied that "two corps" were moving that way. He sent Hardee to Jonesboro, with his own and Lee's corps, to drive them back.

The march began late on the 30th, hence it was noon the next day before the last of the troops reached Jonesboro, hot, tired, and with little stomach for another "killing."

Also on the 30th, Howard's three corps marched from Fairburn and Shadnor Church (Union City) to Renfroe's plantation, west of Jonesboro; but finding no water there, Howard moved on to the Flint River, close to the town. Cavalry had disputed his advance, and he had received reports of an enemy force entrenched to protect the railroad, so he moved forward in two columns, with Logan on the left and Ransom's (Dodge's) XVI Corps on his right. Blair arrived the next morning. Kilpatrick's cavalry preceded both columns.

They advanced so rapidly that upon reaching the river Logan found the bridge intact. Brushing aside cavalry on the east bank. Logan crossed and advanced to the highest ground between the river and the railroad, where he entrenched, with Hazen's division on the left, Harrow's on the right, and Osterhaus' in reserve be­hind them. Howard placed Ransom in position west of the river, facing south.

The next morning Ransom crossed and took position on Logan's right. When Blair arrived he was held west of the river, behind Logan. Through the night the sounds of trains warned Howard that enemy forces were arriving, so he made his lines strong.

At 3 o'clock. Hardee advanced to attack Howard's line, with Lee on the right and his own troops, commanded by Cleburnc, on the left. Cleburne was to wheel to the right and attack Ransom's re­fused right flank, posted behind a wide, swampy ravine, while Lee moved against Logan's front. The sound of Cleburne's firing was to be Lee's signal to advance. But the left of Cleburne's line became engaged with part of Kilpatrick's cavalry and drove it back across the river before Cleburne's actual movement could be effected. Mistaking the small affair with Kilpatrick for Cleburne's assault on Ransom's right, Lee ordered his men forward. Although they charged with a yell and overran the rifle pits of Logan's skirmishers, as they approached his main line they seemed to lack the spirit which had marked their assaults at Ezra Church. Yet, when night fell an appalling number of  dead  and   wounded   lay  under the stars.

Although  he worked hard to retrieve the blunder on his left, Cleburne  was unable  to  deliver  a  coordinated  attack  on  Ransom's line. Finally he gave up  the effort and withdrew.

Shortly after 3  o'clock,  Schofield  and Stanley reached  the  Macon & Western Railroad just below Rough and Ready (Mountain View). Schofield  routed  a  force  of  dismounted  cavalry  entrenched  to  protect  the   railroad,   and   captured   numerous   prisoners.   While   this fight was in  progress, a train from Atlanta came in  sight. The engineer hastily reversed his engine and steamed back to Atlanta to report  that Federals were moving north from Rough and Ready.

Bewildered by rumors and unaware of the battle raging at Jonesboro, Hood jumped to the conclusion that Sherman had turned his left and was advancing to attack Atlanta from  the  south. Without attempting  to  learn Hardee's situation  Hood   ordered  him,  by mounted  courier,  to return  Lee  to Atlanta. Lee was  to  "march  by 2 o'clock   tomorrow   morning."

It was one o'clock when the  courier reached Hardee, but   Lee

assembled  the shattered remnants of  his corps and began   his march. It was a futile move. Atlanta was doomed.

The next morning, September 1, Hardee stretched his corps front to include Lee's position of the day before. His extreme right was sharply refused and, where it crossed the railroad, ran southeast. Cleburne's division was on the right, with Govan's brigade in the salient  angle formed  by  the  bend  in  the  line.  Granbury's  was at the Warren house, and Lewis'  between  Govan  and  the railroad. Gist's was east of the railroad. Brown's division, on Cleburne's left, was in line parallel with the railroad, facing Logan's corps.

While Schofield and Stanley were busy destroying the railroad, Stanley nearest to Jonesboro, Davis. accompanied by Sherman and Thomas, arrived near Howard's left with his XIV Corps. Hardee now faced four Federal corps, with two others within easy march.

Learning that Lee had gone, Sherman ordered Thomas to bring Stanley forward quickly and attempt to surround Hardee. Before Stanley could arrive, the attack was launched, the brunt falling on the angle of the works. Bayonets and clubbed muskets sought to stem the tide, but Govan's and Lewis' brigades were swept away. Govan was captured, with 600 of his officers and men and eight guns.

Anxious that Hardee not escape, Thomas himself galloped up the railroad to hurry Stanley's advance. But before Stanley could de­ploy his corps through the unfamiliar woods, night closed down. Hardee extricated his remaining men and retired down the rail­road to Lovejoy's Station, where he halted and again formed an en­trenched line of battle. But before leaving Jonesboro he sent a courier to tell Hood that Jonesboro had fallen, and that the railroad was gone.

When Hood received Hardee's inessage, he had no choice but to evacuate Atlanta. By 5 o'clock, his troops began to march south toward McDonough to reunite with Hardee. By midnight only a few cavalry remained in the city. They had a special mission to perform.

Shortly after midnight, heavy explosions from the vicinity of Oakland Cemetery and the rolling mill startled the remaining citizens. Eighty-one cars loaded with ammunition had been set on fire by the cavalry to keep them from being captured.

To Hood, riding despondently down the McDonough Road, the sounds of the explosions were a requiem for his dead hopes. But to Sherman, waiting at Jonesboro among the living and the dead, they were a paean of triumph. They told him as clearly as the notes of a bugle in the night that "Atlanta is ours, and fairly won."