From Dalton to Atlanta

FROM DALTON TO ATLANTA

A campaign of wits between two wily opponents was waged along this 100-mile route in May-July 1864. The outcome of the Civil War was at stake. But one of the opponents had an enemy at his rear as well as his front.

JEFFERSON DAVIS, President of the Confederacy, faced an unhappy prospect in December 1863. His personal friend, the discredited Braxton Bragg, was relieved-at his own request-as commander of the Army of Tennessee, which lay in demoralized condition at Dalton, Ga. And there was public clamor for him to name as Bragg's successor a man against whom he was intensely prejudiced, Joseph E. Johnston. Davis delayed his decision until the voice of Robert E. Lee was added to others recommending the able Johnston. On December 27 Davis reluctantly appointed "Old Joe" to command the Department and Army of Tennessee.

Johnston accepted, knowing he was taking on a difficult task. After having lost an opportunity to crush Rosecrans' Union Army of the Cumberland the previous September at Chickamauga because of Bragg's ineptitude, the Army of Tennessee was forced to watch the Union army, bottled up in Chattanooga, gain fresh men and supplies day after day until-with U. S. Grant on the scene-the Federals burst out at the Battle of Lookout Mountain (November 24) and routed the Confederates at Missionary Ridge (November 25). Although temporarily safe behind Rocky Face Ridge, the Confederate army was fast losing strength through desertions.

Johnston's job was complicated by the long-standing bad relations between himself and Davis. He felt that Davis had deprived him of his relative rank by an illegal manipulation early in the war. For months, his great military talents had been allowed to lie idle. Davis treated him with curt indifference. On arriving at Dalton, Johnston found a letter from the Confederate President which did little to reassure him. It read, in part:

The effective condition of your new command, as ... reported to me is a matter of much congratulation, and I assure you that nothing shall be wanting on the part of the Government to aid you. You will not need to have it suggested that the imperative demand for prompt and vigorous action arises . . . from the necessity of reoccupying (Tennessee) upon the supplies of which the proper subsistence of our armies materially depends.

Johnston replied in detail about the actual conditions, explaining that the army was demoralized and far below fighting strength. Most of the cavalry was with Longstreet, in East Tennessee. The artillery lacked sufficient horses and was poorly trained. As for moving against the enemy "promptly and vigorously," he pointed out the more obvious difficulties of terrain and manpower:

Chattanooga (now a fortress), the Tennessee River, the rugged desert of the Cumberland Mountains, and an army outnumbering his more than two to one. He summed it up thus:

I can see no other mode of taking the offensive here, than to beat the enemy when he advances, and then move forward. But, to make victory probable, the army must be strengthened.

JOHNSTON faced grim prospects, but whatever his misgivings they were never reflected in the cheerful energy with which he set about his task. He was a modest, kindly man, but a strict disciplinarian and a clear-headed realist. He visited every camp and outpost. He spoke cordially to officers and men alike, and listened attentively to their views. But he asked searching questions, and his keen eyes missed nothing.

Under Bragg furloughs had been rare. Johnston furloughed the entire army, a third at a time. He announced an amnesty for those absent without leave. The response was immediate. Morale rose and, as the news spread, deserters flocked back to the colors.

Johnston worked tirelessly to clothe ragged men, to find shoes for bare feet, and to increase scanty rations. Rewards and punishments, promptly and impartially administered, restored discipline and high standards. Slowly, pride and confidence returned and with them the army's spirit. In a few weeks the Army of Tennessee was a fighting force again and, for the first time in its history, it was devoted to its commander.

Johnston knew that he was expected to hold Dalton, and that any hint of a retreat would incur disfavor. Yet, a realistic analysis of his limited capabilities, and of the advantages which the topography of the region afforded an enemy approach, revealed little hope of remaining there without grave risk.

Dalton was merely the point at which the rout from Missionary Ridge had ended. Although Rocky Face Ridge gave it an appearance of strength, Johnston soon found that the position "had little to recommend it as a defensive one. It neither fully covered its own communications nor threatened those of the enemy."

ROCKY FACE RIDGE is a lofty, sheer rock wall. It begins some seven miles northwest of Dalton and ends in a series of lower ridges 15 miles southwest of the town. Mill Creek Gap (Buzzard's Roost), through which both the highway and the railway to Chattanooga pass, cuts through the ridge three miles from its northern extremity. Five miles below it the old Dalton-La Fayette road passes over Dug Gap, 800 feet above the valley floor.

The lower six miles of the Chattoogata (Rocky Face) Ridges form the east wall of Snake Creek Gap, a narrow valley which opens into Sugar Valley only six miles from Resaca and the Western & Atlantic Railroad-the lifeline of Johnston's army. A parallel ridge, Horn Mountain, forms the west wall of the gap and extends several miles farther to the south. The road from Villanow into Sugar Valley-the most direct road from Chattanooga to Resaca or Calhoun-passes through Snake Creek Gap, affording an easy means of turning Dalton and seizing the railroad.

The railroad paralleled Rocky Face Ridge for 15 miles. Although the ridge sheltered the railroad, it would also mask an enemy approach through Snake Creek Gap. Johnston soon became aware that the topography of the region made Dalton a trap.

HE realized, too, the ease with which Grant could send Sherman's Army of the Tennessee across the Tennessee River in Alabama to march via Rome to Kingston, 40 miles south of Dalton, to destrov the railroad. If this move were made, Johnston would have no choice but to abandon Dalton and march swiftly south to interpose between Sherman and Atlanta. Any threat to Atlanta, or to the rails which linked him with Atlanta's warehouses and manufactories, must be met in force. His army's existence depended upon the trainloads of supplies which reached it daily from this arsenal of the south. Without Atlanta's connecting rails between the East and the West, the Confederacy could not long survive.

Late in February Bragg was called to Richmond as Davis' military adviser. At the same time John B. Hood arrived in Dalton to assume command of a corps. Johnston received him cordially, and reorganized his seven divisions into two permanent corps. To Hardee he assigned four divisions: Cheatham's, Cleburne's, Walker's and Bate's; to Hood, the divisions of Hindman, Stevenson and Stewart.

Knowing Davis' views, Bragg began pressing for an offensive movement into Tennessee. When the responibility had been his just after Chickamauga he had rejected a similar plan as "visionary," even though his was then the victorious army.
Johnston patiently pointed out the only practicable course-to gather strength at Dalton, defeat the enemy when he advanced, and then move forward.

Adequately reinforced and supplied, he had no objection to fighting at Dalton and pursuing a beaten enemy into Tennessee. But it must be a beaten foe, not one which, could turn on him from secure bases after he had crossed the river and entered a country destitute of supplies. He had neither the men, the means, nor the hope of reinforcement. His opponent had all three. For Grant, close to fortified bases and with reinforcements within call, defeat would be an incident. For Johnston, and for the South, it would be a disaster. But Bragg persisted; and with each refusal to commit his army to a possible disaster, Johnston widened the gulf between Davis and himself.

A NEW FACTOR-time-had given the Confederacy fresh hope of victory. If Union arms could be denied a major victory until after the November elections, then a war-weary North, persuaded by the powerful "Copperhead" leaders that the war was a failure, might reject President Lincoln's bid for reelection. On the other hand, the fall of Richmond or Atlanta would give Lincoln the great victory to revive the Northern people's will to win. No lesser victory would serve. Lee's army unquestionably could hold Richmond until long past November. And Johnston was confident that the reborn Army of Tennessee could hold the vast fortifications of Atlanta "forever" once it reached there. Shattered in Tennessee, his army could not defend Atlanta.

Time offered another advantage. The three-year enlistments of the Union veteran regiments would expire soon and, as Johnston was well aware, many of them would not be renewed.

In Richmond these factors were ignored.

To Johnston's annoyance Hood also pressed him to assume the offensive. Moreover, unknown to Johnston, in correspondence with Davis, Seddon, and Bragg, Hood was misrepresenting conditions at Dalton.

Hood reported the army "well clothed, well fed," and "anxious for battle." He stated that the army's trains were in the "greatest possible quantity required." Only a few artillery horses were needed to "place this army in fine condition." The enemy, he insisted, was "weak, and we are strong." Although he reported Johnston's aggregate strength accurately as about 40,000 men, he underestimated that of the enemy by 50,000. The addition of Longstreet's corps and Folk's Army of Mississippi would, he stated, give Johnston a force which could "defeat and destroy all the Federals on this side of the Ohio River."

Although the Army of Tennessee was rapidly being restored to effective condition, it was far from ready to fight a superior foe. Yet Hood advised Bragg that only Johnston's unwillingness prevented an advance into Tennessee. Reports rendered by inspectors from Richmond contradicted Hood's assertions. One, with reasonable accuracy, estimated Grant's strength at 103,000. But these reports were ignored.

GRANT was made lieutenant general in March and was given command of all the Union armies. Sherman succeeded him as commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi which covered all the western armies. Grant set May 5 as the date on which Meade's Army of the Potomac, Butler's Army of the James, and Sherman's armies would move upon the enemy. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and Johnston's Army of Tennessee, "and the cities (Richmond and Atlanta) covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign." After a final conference with Sherman, Grant departed for Virginia and on March 18 Sherman assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. McPherson succeeded him as commander of the Department and Army of the Tennessee.

Sherman plunged energetically into the tasks of readying his armies and of increasing the capacity of the war-worn, ill-equipped railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga to a minimum of 1,300 tons of freight per day. Although he hoped to trap Johnston's army near Dalton, thus avoiding a long and costly campaign, he respected Johnston's abilities too highly to leave anything to chance.

Johnston was no less busy. Although the defenses of Dalton had already been strengthened, and the Army of Tennessee was ready to defend them, other measures had to be taken. He must be ready to leave Dalton on short notice, either by rail to Kingston or by marching to intercept a closer approach to his rear.

Paralleling Rocky Face Ridge and Horn Mountain lay another barrier-Taylor's Ridge. It extends from Ring-gold, on the north, some 30 miles southwestward. Within the area of approach, three roads crossed it. One lay over Nickajack Gap, 10 miles south of Ring-gold at Wood Station. Another passed over Gordon Springs Gap, five miles farther south, near the intersection of the Tarvin (Tavern) and Old Alabama roads. The most practicable route for a force moving from Tennessee into Snake Creek Gap lay over Ship's (Maddox) Gap, three miles farther south and eight miles west of Snake Creek Gap. An enemy force marching from the west, with Calhoun or Resaca as its objective, would be forced to use one of these gaps to reach Snake Creek Gap, Dalton's Achilles heel.

SINCE DECEMBER elements of Wheeler's cavalry had picketed the gaps and patrolled the country between Rocky Face and Taylor's Ridges. Should a large enemy force approach Taylor's Ridge, Johnston relied upon them to warn him of the danger. He could then evacuate Dalton without loss or confusion, and fall back quickly into selected positions covering the railroad. But to fall back in ample time to frustrate the enemy, he must be prepared in minute detail.

Skilfully Johnston laid his plans. He sent his baggage trains to good grazing areas below the Oostanaula. The roads leading south from Dalton were improved and other roads prepared. Since Resaca with its railroad bridge over the Oostanaula would be a prime objective of a force bent upon destroying the railroad, preparations were made to defend it. A line was staked out on commanding ground in a three-mile arc north and west of Resaca, its right resting on Connesauga Creek and its left on the Oostanaula. With the route of each column designated in advance, and guides provided to conduct them, the whole army could move smoothly into prepared positions.

With his plans laid and their execution well begun, Johnston awaited developments with confidence both in the vigilance of the cavalry pickets on Taylor's Ridge and in the Army of Tennessee. Out of the shattered wreckage of the latter he had recreated an army. It was proud again, and ready to fight. A broad trail of Union blood would soon bear witness to its excellence.

On May 1, with the railroad rebuilt, and its rolling stock increased to meet his needs, Sherman moved forward from Nashville to open his campaign. The combined strength of his "grand army," after detaching the garrisons for his bases and for the blockhouses which protected the railroad, was 98,797 officers and men and 254 field guns. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland, which had wintered at Chattanooga, Ringgold, and Cleveland, Tennessee, numbered 60,773 and 130 guns. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee had 24,465 and 96 guns. Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, commanding the Department and Army of the Ohio, furnished only the XXIII Corps, which he chose to command in person, and one division of George Stoneman's four-division cavalry corps, under Stoneman himself. Their total strength was 13,559, and 28 guns. Since the strengths of his armies were far from proportionate, Sherman employed Thomas as the center and the smaller armies on the flanks.

Recruits, small reinforcements, and the return of the cavalry had brought the aggregate strength of Johnston's Army of Tennessee to 63,777 officers and men and 144 guns. Of these, 43,887 were "effectives." More reinforcements were on the way, but Sherman possessed the advantage of far superior numbers.

He enjoyed another advantage. His three senior subordinates-Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield-were fit and loyal leaders. And he could depend upon the loyal support of his superiors.

Johnston was less fortunate. Of his two principal lieutenants, Hardee was both fit and loyal, but Hood was untested. Despite a reputation as a brave division leader, he had faced none of the problems of corps command. And Johnston could expect no loyal support from above.

As Johnston had foreseen, Sherman first intended to send McPherson across Alabama to destroy the railroad at Kingston. But the absence of four of McPherson's divisions decided Sherman against sending him so far from support. Instead, he ordered him to move through Chattanooga to Johnston's immediate rear-via Snake Creek Gap.

Aware that Johnston would anticipate the plan, Sherman issued no warning order. He wanted no flurry of preparations to alert enemy agents to the impending move. McPherson's first orders were to march, and he departed so quickly that Johnston's agents failed him.

ON the 1st and 2d, Kilpatrick's Union cavalry, probing toward Tunnel Hill, skirmished with Wheeler's outposts near Ringgold Gap and at Dr. Lee's. As Thomas' army (the IV, XIV, and XX Corps and McCook's, Garrard's and Kilpatrick's cavalry divisions) closed on Dalton from the west, and Schofield from the north, sharper clashes occurred at Catoosa Springs and Red Clay on the 3d, near Varnell's and Tunnel Hill on the 4th and 5th, and at these points and near Nickajack Gap on the 6th and 7th.

By the 7th, Hooker's XX Corps had moved through Nickajack Gap and into positions facing Rocky Face Ridge. Palmer's XIV Corps had moved out from Ringgold and taken position on Hooker's left, on Tunnel Hill Ridge. After slight resistance Wrheeler retired within the defenses at Mill Creek Gap. Howard's IV Corps had moved down from Cleveland to Catoosa Springs, on Palmer's left, opposite the north end of Rocky Face Ridge. Schofield's XXIII Corps had moved down from Knoxville and was deployed across Crow Valley on Howard's left. As Stoneman was delayed, McCook's cavalry covered Schofield's left.

Also on the 7th, McPherson's swift columns, Logan's XV and Dodge's XVI Corps, which had passed through Chattanooga the day before, marched from Lee's and Gordon's Mill to Taylor's Ridge, undetected by the Southern cavalry pickets. Sprague's brigade seized Ship's Gap without resistance. Unknown to Johnston, the pickets had been withdrawn.

Unaware of McPherson's approach. Johnston watched the storm gathering in his front. It was obvious that Sherman meant to test the defenses of Dalton. Johnston was confident that the Army of Tennessee would hold them until the attackers staggered back to count their dead. But should it become apparent that Sherman was merely demonstrating strongly, to divert his attention from his rear, an attempt to cling to Dalton with a reduced force while a detachment sought to defend any other point would be folly. He must then break free quickly and retire to Resaca.

ALTHOUGH late reports had indicated that McPherson might be moving toward Rome, Kingston was now in little danger. Cantey's brigade, which had been ordered to Johnston from Mobile, had been stopped at Rome. And President Davis had been persuaded to order Polk there, with Loring's division "and any other available force at your command." Alive to the danger at Dallon, Polk had construed the order literally. Already, Loring's division was en route to Rome, and Reynolds' brigade would follow him. A few days later French's division would move to join them, as would Jackson's cavalry division. Johnston would have a third corps.

When other troops reached Rome, Cantey was ordered on to Resaca where, with Selden's and Yates's batteries, he detrained on the 7th.

McPherson moved on the 8th to Villanow with his advance in Snake Creek Gap. Thomas and Schofield were pressing hard at Dalton and, to further divert Johnston's attention, Geary's division of Hooker's corps made a spirited but unsuccessful attack on Dug Gap. Although cavalry scouts reported "Yankees in vicinity of Villanow today," they made no mention of a large infantry force. And Kilpatrick's cavalry was in the vicinity covering Geary's flank.

Early on the 9th the head of McPherson's column debouched from the gap into Sugar Valley. It clashed with Grigsby's cavalry brigade, en route to investigate matters at Villanow. Grigsby retired to Resaca where his dismounted men joined Canley's in the defenses.

Sherman was overjoyed when he learned that his plan to trap Johnston was so near success.

"I've got Joe Johnston dead!" he exulted. But already the attempt had failed.

A mile west of Resaca, McPherson's skirmishers drove Cantey's outposts from a long range of hills which border Camp Creek on the west. Across the broad valley in his front McPherson saw fortified hills, behind which nestled Reseca. Artillery fire warned him that the town was strongly defended.

McPHERSON had been ordered to destroy a section of the railroad beyond immediate repair and, that task accomplished, to fall back to Snake Creek Gap, poised to harass Johnston's hasty retreat. But mounted infantry, probing from his left, found that the railroad swung east immediately above Resaca. To reach it, he must pass between Resaca and Dalton; and the sight of Johnston's prepared roads deterred him. Others had learned of Johnston's ability to deliver quick, punishing counter blows, and he was far from support. He retired to the gap and intrenched.

The heavily wooded country masked the size and identity of McPherson's force. Both Geary and Kilpatrick were beyond Johnston's immediate view, and no word had reached him of McPherson's arrival. He had yet to learn that Ship's Gap had been left unguarded.

He sent Hood with three divisions to Resaca to investigate; but though Hood confirmed the presence of the enemy in the gap, he failed to learn their identity. Upon reporting that they were retiring, he was recalled, leaving Cleburne's and Walker's divisions near Tilton, on the railroad north of Dalton.

Although bitterly disappointed at McPherson's failure, Sherman acted quickly. Thomas was ordered to move through the gap, Schofield to follow him. Howard's corps and McCook's cavalry were to remain to hold Johnston's attention. The movement was made as rapidly as the one narrow road through the gap would permit, but the passage was not completed until the morning of the 13th.

EARLY on the llth Johnston learned that an enemy corps was "supposed" to be in Snake Creek Gap. Investigation confirmed its presence. Immediately he ordered Polk to Resaca and sent for Wheeler, apparently for explanation of the cavalry's failure. Since Johnston never "threw off" on his subordinates, what was said has never been revealed.

Having detected Sherman's intentions, Johnston began his withdrawal. Even without the warning upon which he had counted his preparations were so complete that, during the night of the 12th, Dalton was completely evacuated without confusion. Next morning Howard's IV Corps followed him through the town. By daylight on the 13th the Army of Tennessee was moving into prepared positions, well before Sherman could deploy and move forward. Folk's left rested on the river, Hardec was in the center, and Hood on the right.

During the day McPherson reoccupied the hills along Camp Creek, his right resting on the river. Hooker formed on his left. Palmer extended the line to meet Schofield, near the head of the valley where the Confederate line turned east to the railroad. Howard deployed facing the latter line, but Hood's right division- Stewart's-overlapped his left.

On the 14th an ill-advised assault by Judah's division of Schofield's corps was repulsed with severe loss. Stewart attacked Howard's left; but the arrival of Hooker, who had been shifted to the left, saved it from disaster. Heavy firing continued all along the line until nightfall.

Fighting raged furiously again on the 15th. During the afternoon McPherson launched an attack across Camp Creek which drove Polk from commanding ground south of the Resaca road from which the bridges over the river could be shelled. To relieve this pressure Johnston prepared to launch another blow at Sherman's left. But learning that Sweeney's division of Dodge's corps was crossing the river at Lay's Ferry, a few miles downstream, to gain his rear, he recalled the assaulting force and issued orders for a withdrawal.

He withdrew his army skilfully that night, but not until the four guns of Van Den Corput's Georgia battery, unwisely exposed by Flood, had been captured. Sherman had lost his opportunity to trap Johnston north of the Oostanaula and end the campaign at little cost.

EARLY on the 16th Sherman pressed after him; but the passage of the river with his larger force, encumbered with long trains, was slow. Although McPherson, crossing at Lay's Ferry, forced Hardee to fight near Calhoun for the safety of his trains, the day passed without further incident.

On the I7th Johnston reached Adairsville, 10 miles below Calhoun. Hoping to delude Sherman, he divided his forces temporarily. He sent Hardee, with the entire baggage train, along the main road, which followed the railroad to Kingston. At Kingston the railroad swung to the east. Near Cassville it turned south again toward the Klowah River. A little-used road led over the dry, sparsely settled Gravelly Plateau directly to Cassville, six miles east of Kingston. He sent Polk and Hood, with a bare minimum of ammunition wagons and ambulances, to Cassville. He accompanied this column.

To gain time to get the trains clear of Adairsville, he had left Cheatham's division on strong ground astride the road, three miles above Adairsville, under orders to delay Sherman. Cheatham did his work nobly. He forced the entire IV Corps, Thomas' leading clement, to halt and deploy. Although hard pressed, Cheatham held his ground until the trains were safely on the road to Kingston and Johnston had recalled him.

Next morning Sherman found conflicting evidence at Adairsville. The passage of so many trains created the impression that Johnston's main force had taken the road to Kingston. The few wagons, together with tight march discipline, made it appear that only a small column had marched straight to Cassville, to protect Johns-ton's left flank. Yet, since he could reach the railroad near Cassville by that road, and destroy it before Johnston could swing over to defend it, logic disputed the evidence-unless Johnston meant to cross the Etowah below Kingston and return to the railroad south of the river.

SHERMAN'S COLUMNS were marching abreast of each other on roads which, on the maps, appeared to converge on Kingston. Thomas was in the center, McPherson on the right, and Schofield on the left. Schofield had reached Mosteller's Mill, six miles east of Adairsville. His route would take him close to Cassville.

"All signs continue of Johnston's having retreated on Kingston," Sherman wrote to Schofield, "and why he should lead to Kingston ... I do not see ... (unless) his wagons are escaping south of the Etowah by the bridge and fords near Kingston. In any hypothesis our plan is right." He could not afford to ignore the possibility of Johnston's being concentrated at Kingston; yet, in case he was wrong and Schofield was attacked as he passed Cassville, Hooker would be close by to support him. Furthermore, the IV and XIV Corps, on the Kingston road, could move quickly across country to join them. Schofield would continue toward Cassville, Hooker would take the road over the plateau, and Thomas would move on Kingston. McPherson would be close at hand.

At Cassville, Johnston set a trap. Schofield's route would bring him into the road over the plateau, north of Cassville. A little to the east, the road from Spring Place lay parallel to it. Hood was to march out the Spring Place road, and Polk to take position astride the road from Adairsville. When Schofield approached, Polk would engage him in front while Hood struck his left. Before help could reach him, Schofield would be crushed.

Johnston rode out the Spring Place road early on the 19th with Hood, Polk, and Hardee, to show Hood his position. Hood moved into it.

About 10:20 a.m., artillery firing was heard farther up the Adairsville road and, 10 minutes later, from an "easterly direction." As time passed and no other sounds of battle were heard, Johnston learned that Hood had left his assigned position and taken up another astride the Canton Road, facing east, to meet a supposed force of infantry and artillery approaching from that direction. The force proved to be, as Hood later admitted in his report, "the enemy's cavalry." McCook's division, with a battery of guns, was engaging Hood's skirmishers. Whether by accident or design, Hood had denied Johnston his first opportunity to disrupt Sherman's plans with little loss to himself.

JOHNSTON now withdrew Hood and Polk to a semicircular ridge south and east of Cassville. Hood was posted on the right, Polk occupied the center, and Hardee, whose corps was fighting steadily with Thomas' troops as it retired from Kingston, would hold the more exposed left. The trains had passed to the rear of the army, toward the river. Strong positions were prepared and Johnston informed the army that Sherman's further progress would be met by battle.

In the afternoon Hooker appeared opposite Cassville, with Schofield on his left. Posted on hills beyond the town, his artillery shelled Folk's position, but inflicted little damage. French's division, which bore the brunt of the shelling, had one officer and nine men wounded, and three horses killed.

Hood brought Polk into conference with Johnston that night. Apparently he had persuaded Polk that the line was endangered by enfilading fire from enemy batteries on their right. Since the Union left was opposite Hood's front, Johnston insisted that this could not be the case. Nevertheless Johnston was dismayed by Hood's insistence-in which Polk concurred-that the line could not be held. Since two of his corps commanders-Hardee was not present-were so sure of defeat, he decided not to risk their fears spreading through their ranks. Reluctantly he gave the order to retire across the Etowah. Hardee was outraged when he learned this. Again Hood had robbed Johnston of an opportunity.

Johnston retired across the Etowah and into the fastnesses of the Allatoona range, where he hoped that Sherman would follow. But Sherman, who had ridden through the area years earlier, remembered its defensive strength. Instead, he rested and refilled his armies for three days while he planned the next move.

SINCE the railroad ran through Allatoona Pass, Sherman had to resort to his wagons until he could regain it farther south. He made Kingston a strong base, and on the 23rd crossed the Etowah beyond Johnston's view, and marched straight for Dallas, 20 miles in Johnston's left rear. If he eluded Johnston, he would be closer to Atlanta than his foe. Davis' division of Palmer's corps, which he had sent from Resaca to capture Rome, was ordered to rejoin Palmer en route.

But the "lynx-eyed watchfulness" with which Sherman later credited Johnston detected his purpose, and on the 25th Sherman found him blocking his roads at New Hope Church and Dallas. Thomas was deployed along the New Hope Church line, with Schofield on his left, and McPherson in front of Dallas. Heavy fighting developed. At Pickett's Mill, northeast of New Hope Church, in a tangled country of deep ravines and easily defended ridges, an attempt by Howard to turn Johnston's right met a costly repulse.

On the 28th Sherman ordered McPherson to withdraw from Dallas and move around to the left of the army. But not until June 1 could McPherson disengage his forces from the vigilant enemy, which attacked him whenever he began to move.

Having forced Johnston to leave Allatoona, Sherman began moving to his left to regain the railroad. He sent Stoneman and Garrard to seize the pass, which they found unoccupied. Sherman ordered the railroad repaired through Allatoona, and a forward base established there.

Detecting Sherman's intention, John.slon withdrew in the night and fell back to a line embracing Lost and Pine Mountains. On June 6 McPherson, now on the left, reached the railroad at Ackworth, where two days later Blair's XVII Corps rejoined him from veteran furlough.

On the 14th Polk was killed by an artillery projectile on Pine Mountain. A. P. Stewart was promoted to succeed him.

Johnston fell back on the 19th to the Kennesaw line, with Hood on the right, extending to the railroad, Folk's divisions in the center, and Hardee on the left.

ALTHOUGH the railroad below Marietta invited a move around Johnston's left, the incessant rains had made the country in front of his line a vast bog. Sherman was mud-bound. Impatient of delay, he searched for a weak point in the defenses. At an angle in the line, west of the Dallas road, he selected what appeared to be a favorable point. Although Johnston had fortified heavily, his army was stretched thin. If an assaulting force could break it, reserves massed behind them could pour through the break, overrun Johnston's train bivouacs, and split his army in two. Plans made, Sherman issued his orders.

The assault was launched on the 27th. Although the approach was difficult, Col. Daniel McCook's and Harker's brigades of Thomas' army reached the enemy works. Harker was killed and his men were forced back by a withering fire. McCook's men gained the parapets in their front and success seemed sure; but Mitchell's brigade, on the right, failed to support them and they, too, were forced back. Dan McCook fell mortally wounded. Sherman's second hope of ending the campaign was shattered.

The rain had stopped and the wagons could move again, so a shift around Johnston's left forced him to retire. He fell back on the night of July 2 to prepared works astride the railroad at Smyrna, below Marietta, where Sherman attacked him on the 4th. Again his left was turned, and he withdrew into works of great strength near the Chattahoochee. In each case these works had been prepared solely to gain him time. Under cover of the river line he passed his trains safely across and prepared bridges for his troops. Sherman followed him closely but made no attacks on Johnston's formidable works. Instead, he began to cross the river at other points.

On the 8th, while McPherson feinted at Turner's Ferry, on Johnston's left. Schofield crossed the river at the mouth of Soap Creek, upriver from Johnston's right, and occupied a high ridge. The next day Garrard crossed at Roswell, farther up river.

THESE CROSSINGS, which Johnston could not prevent, left him no choice. He crossed his army safely on the night of the 10th and moved toward Atlanta.

Sherman shifted McPherson upriver to Roswell where he crossed the stream and, on the 17th, marched toward Stone Mountain. Upon reaching it he turned toward Atlanta and began destroying the Georgia Railroad from that point to Decatur.

All of Thomas' army had crossed by the 19th at Power's and Pace's Ferries, and had begun moving toward Peach tree Creek. For the first time Sherman's wings were widely separated.

Overlooking the valley of Peach tree Creek, midway between that stream and the city's fortifications, Johnston directed that another line be constructed-his Peach tree Line. Hardee and Stewart were ordered to occupy this line, with Hardee on the right. Hood would be placed east of Atlanta to check McPherson's approach.

From this line, Johnston planned to launch Hardee and Stewart at Thomas. Separated from McPherson-and Schofield, who was moving to a position between them-Thomas' forces would be engaged in crossing Peach tree Creek. Thomas' army would be wrecked; if not, the Army of Tennessee had "a near and secure place of refuge in Atlanta." In either case Johnston planned to man the defenses with stale troops, move out with his whole army, and crush McPherson. He had planned competently, but the sword was about to be struck from his hand.

ON THE 13TH Bragg arrived in Atlanta. Before calling on Johnston he wired Davis that "indications seem to favor an entire evacuation of this place." When he saw Johnston he assured him that he was not there officially, but merely en route to Mont-gomery. Although the matter was not discussed, and Johnston's preparations spoke for themselves, he wired that he could not learn that Johnston "has any more plan for the future than he has had in the past."

Bragg met secretly with Hood, who gave him a written statement of his views. In it, Hood stated that he had "so often urged that we should force the enemy to give us battle as to almost be regarded reckless." Yet an entry in the journal kept by Lt. T. B. Mackall observes-"Feeling in the army: One lieutenant-general talks about attack and not giving ground, publicly, and quietly urges retreat."

Immediately Davis wired to Johnston requesting his plans. Unfortunately for himself, Johnston did not trust the details to the telegraph and answered in general terms.

Obviously Bragg had been sent to effect Johnston's relief from command. Bragg's wires, together with Johnston's reluctance to explain his intentions in detail, gave Davis an opening. On the night of July 17 Johnston received a wire notifying him that be-cause he had failed both "to arrest the advance of, the enemy" and to express confidence in his ability to "defeat or repel him" he was relieved from command. Hood would succeed him.

NEXT MORNING Johnston explained his plans to Hood and, at Hood's request, issued orders placing the troops in position. When all was done, he prepared a farewell message to the troops and sorrowfully departed.

Until the news spread through the ranks, the men had been confident of success. Morale was at high pitch. "Old Joe" had brought them safely to Atlanta, at far greater cost to the enemy than to themselves. When they learned that he had gone, "universal gloom seemed cast over the army." Bearded men wept. Many threw away their arms and deserted. The Army of Tennessee had little confidence in his successor.