Cavalry Operations Around Atlanta

By turning his cavalry loose on the supply lines to Atlanta, Sherman thought he could force the Confederates to abandon the city. Wheeler's Southern horsemen frustrated his plan in a series of hard-riding , bitterly fought encounters.

 As a young artilleryman, and in responsible staff assignments, Sherman had shown unusual promise. Later, in every stage of com­mand from the brigade to the army, he displayed a comprehensive grasp of the successful employment of infantry and artillery. But though experience had taught him the abilities and the limita­tions of cavalry, his innate impatience caused him to expect results from his cavalry beyond the capacity of horseflesh to endure.

 He correctly used his four cavalry divisions during the Atlanta campaign to screen his flanks, perform reconnaissance, guard his own lines of communications, and attack those of the enemy. But the operations of his separate cavalry divisions were not always well coordinated; and he never used his mounted arm in mass, in part because he had no worthy chief of cavalry and, in part, because the terrain offered few opportunities for such employment.

 Several times Sherman employed his cavalry piecemeal, a division at a time, to attack hostile lifelines. The results invariably were disappointing; the Confederates had the interrupted rail lines operating again within a few days. Sherman thought that this was because the cavalry was too lazy to tear up enough trackage. He was wrong. The Confederates, as long as they had the materials, could re-lay track, not perfectly but well enough for the slow traffic then operating, almost as fast as the Federals could heat and twist the rails. Destruction of railroads was an engineer's task, requiring trained men and technical equipment. Since the railroads lacked earth-moving equipment other than the mule and the man with a shovel, the way to put a permanent crimp in a line was to blow out huge holes and ditches at key points-defiles, passes, and the like. Blasting was effective to destroy bridges, though only engineers with "torpedoes" could rip apart a large iron bridge. Special "pioneer" detachments under an engineer officer should have accompanied each cavalry force used on the raids against the Confederate lines of communications.

 IN JUNE Sherman had permitted Rousseau to make a cavalry raid into Alabama to break up the Montgomery and West Point Railroad. At first this seemed to have been successful, and Sherman commended Rousseau. Later he changed his mind, remarking that while the raid must have bothered the enemy "as usual the cavalry did not work very hard and their destruction of the railroad was soon repaired."

 The following month, as Sherman closed in on Atlanta, the city was being fed by three rail lines: the Georgia, running east to Augusta and Charleston: the Macon & Western; and the Atlanta & West Point to West Point. The last two united at East Point, just south of Atlanta, and continued into the city on a common right-of-way. To sever connections here would have been a logical choice, but the area was too close to Hood's infantry, necessitating a target much farther south. Such a raid promised big dividends; if successful, the Confederates would be forced to evacuate Atlanta.

 On July 22 Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard's cavalry division marched from Decatur, an eastern suburb of Atlanta, southeast to Covington, where the men tore up six miles of the Georgia Railroad tracks and destroyed rolling stock, army stores, and new hospital buildings. Sherman then planned to cut the Macon and West Point lines, last working supply channels into Atlanta, by shifting Howard's Army of the Tennessee to a point on the railroad south of the city. Since this might be a slow operation, Sherman ordered another cavalry raid to break up the railroad near Lovejoy's Station, 26 miles below Atlanta. This may haye seemed to Sherman to be a deep penetra­tion, and for infantry it would have been.

 SHERMAN called in his cavalry division commanders to explain the details of this new and vital operation. None questioned the plan, and all seemed confident of success. Brig. Gen. George Stone-man, a distinguished failure from the Chancellorsville Campaign, who had been sloughed off on Sherman, with Garrard's division in addition to his own, was to move from the east flank to McDonough, where he was to make junction with Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook's division. Together they would smash the Macon railroad near Lovejoy Station, then proceed south to Macon, tear­ing up the line as they went and destroying supplies. McCook was to circle around the west flank to Lovejoy's and join Stoneman on the night of the 28th. Both were charged with whipping Wheeler if that bantam Confederate cavalry commander made an appear­ance.

 Before the raid got under way, Stoneman requested and received permission to continue 50 miles southwest of Macon to Anderson­ville to liberate the 30,000 Federal prisoners suffering and dying there. Sherman, though charmed with the idea, stressed that the junction with McCook must be made first, and the railroad de­stroyed.

 MAJ. GEN. JOSEPH (FIGHTING JOE) WHEELER, Hood's chief of cavalry, was then 28. A native Georgian, he is usually thought of today as an Alabamian. After graduating from West Point in 1859 he served on the western frontier until 1861. He was "a small, slight man, very quick and alert in his movements, surcharged with electricity . . . He never walked, he loped ... he is frank, fearless, blunt." He was humorless, pompous, and pedantic. He served in the U.S. Army as a major general during the Spanish-American War, and was said to have cried, as he led his men in a charge against the Spaniards. "There go the dam yankees, boys! Give 'em hell!"

 On the morning of July 27, as the Federal cavalry raid was get­ting under way, Wheeler's cavalry corps had just been put into the trenches to relieve Hardee's infantry. Fighting Joe, chafing at this role, so humiliating to any cavalryman, learned at noon that Garrard's division was moving toward Flat Rock, 15 miles south­east of Decatur. His quick perception instantly told him that another raid against the railroad was in progress, and he correctly deduced that the Federals would probably strike the line near Jonesboro. Hourly for the rest of the afternoon he importuned Hood to turn the cavalry loose to block this threat. In the evening Hood finally acceded, insisting, however, that Wheeler himself re­main near headquarters unless it became necessary to use the bulk of his command.

 Wheeler saw to it that it was. As his brigades were relieved from the defensive works and reassembled with their mounts, he got them on the road and headed for Flat Rock. Brig. Gen. William Wirt Alien's brigade of Martin's division was in the lead and far ahead of the next unit. Delayed by having to supervise the de­parture of succeeding units, Wheeler did not get away until 9 p.m. By riding hard and not halting for a breather, he overtook Allen as skirmishing had already begun along South River near Flat Shoals, (vicinity of Flat Rock) with the advance elements of Garrard's division. When the next brigade arrived, Wheeler sent it around to the north to get in rear of the enemy, and as other units reported he lined them up for an attack on the head of the Yankee column. He advanced in the misty half-light of an early dawm, driving in the Federal outposts to where the supports were erecting barricades along the bank of the stream.

 His immediate opponent, Garrard, 34, was a native of Cincin­nati, a prewar dragoon who was captured in Texas before the war started, then was paroled and exchanged in 1862. He had won his star after service as a regimental commander in the major campaign of 1863 in Virginia and Pennsylvania. That morning Garrard had been directed by Stoneman to go to Flat Rock and wait for him there. Stoneman's purpose ostensibly was to protect his inside flank; hut though Garrard was unaware of it, Stoneman now had no in­tention of going to Flat Rock nor to McDonough. He was swing­ing out wider, through Covington, and was headed straight for Macon without pausing to comply with Sherman's orders that he work in conjunction with the other two divisions. He had privately determined to liberate the prisoners at Andersonville before attempt­ing to destroy the railroad. Since Garrard did not know this, he was, in accordance with his orders, remaining in the Flat Rock area on the 28th until he heard from Stoneman. Therefore he re­tired carefully from Wheeler's attack, pulling back slowly to Latimer's Corner (now Belmont) a few miles to the north. He remained here until the 29th. skirmishing with Wheeler, who was merely trying to hold him in place.

 ON JULY 29 Wheeler learned from two prisoners that Stone­man with another division was moving toward Macon. About the same time a courier came from Hood's chief of staff with equally disturbing news. Another large force of Federal cavalry was mov­ing around the Confederate left flank, apparently bent on de­stroying the railroad south of Atlanta. It was doubted that Brig. Gen. W. H. Jackson's cavalry division, guarding that flank, would be able to cope with this menace. It was up to Wheeler to send reinforcements to Jackson.

 Wheeler faced an agonizing decision. None of the three enemy forces could be left unwatched and unhampered, for each was capable of doing great damage. Did he have enough troops to split his command three ways? He did not-each of the hostile di­visions at the moment was greater than his own-but he decided to do so anyway. He gave Iverson his own brigade and two others and sent him after Stoneman. Dibrell's brigade was instructed to re­main near Latimer's to watch Garrard; the latter seemed quiescent, With the two remaining brigades and another which was on the way and would follow him, Wheeler himself would hasten west­ward to help Jackson.

 SHERMAN'S RIGHT FLANK cavalry division under McCook, which formed the west arm of the pincer that was designed to nip off Hood's lifeline, moved out at daylight on the 27th and crossed the Chattahoochee River at Turner's Ferry, due west of Atlanta. McCook, one of the "17 Fighting McCooks" from Ohio, was 31. He had entered the Army from civil life as a volunteer secret service agent, but soon became a major in the cavalry and had gained his star in April 1864. Brave and self-reliant, he was re­garded by Grant and Sherman as a promising young general.

 The command, consisting of McCook's own division of two bri­gades, plus a somewhat fatigued brigade from Rousseau's force that had come in from the Alabama raid, marched down the west side of the river to Rivertown (or Riverton), sometimes called Smith's Ferry, six miles below Campbellton. Arriving at 3 p.m., they waited 12 hours for their pontoon train to come up. While the bridge was being thrown across the river, the leading brigade was shuttled over in a single boat. There was no opposition, though a few Reb cavalry scouts fled at their approach, and rode to warn Jackson. The 1st Wisconsin was sent north to Campbellton to screen and protect the crossing of the rest of the division from Jackson's cavalry, expected to react soon.

 Frank Armstrong's brigade of Jackson's division showed up two miles from Campbellton on the Fairburn road, attacked the 1st Wisconsin, killed its commander, Maj. Nathan Paine, and 10 others and drove the Yankees back to the river. The 1st Wisconsin slipped to the south after dark, took up the pontoon bridge and escorted it to Marietta. The diversion they had created prevented Jackson from discovering that the bulk of McCook's force was marching southeast toward Palmetto.

 At Palmetto McCook tore up two miles of track and telegraph line on the Atlanta & West Point Railroad, then continued to Fayette-ville, where he arrived at daylight on the 29th. He was a day late for the supposed rendezvous with Stoneman and Garrard, but his scouts informed him that there was no sign of either for miles to the east. For five miles west of Fayetteville both sides of the road were lined with Confederate wagon trains accompanied by Confederate train guards. McCook burned the wagons and their contents and had his men slaughter the mules-using sabers lest gunfire direct the enemy to the locality. Five hundred wagons and 800 mules were disposed of at this point. The march continued to Lovejoy's Station, additional wagons and animals being destroyed .along the way. By now McCook had 300 disgruntled prisoners, snatched from their supposedly safe nests far in rear of the front.

 McCook remained at Lovejoy's from 7 a.m. to 2 p.m. on the 29th, waiting for word from Stoneman. He destroyed several miles of the Macon rail line (he says five, the Confederates say 1 ½) and burned large quantities of cotton and military supplies. Also by this time he had destroyed 1,160 wagons and 2,000 mules, badly needed by Hood's command. McCook very reasonably pointed out to Sherman in his report that he had accomplished his mission in every detail. However, and this was the prime cause of Sherman's subsequent unhappiness, the Rebels had the railroad back in operation in two days. Indeed, they had started loading cars with materials and assembling repair crews as soon as they heard that McCook had commenced his raid.

 THE FEDERALS had a very rough time of it on their return trip, partly because of a poorly conducted night march and partly because of Wheeler's vigorous pursuit and harrassing tactics. A day and a night had passed with no word received since the appointed time of the meeting with Stoneman; and it was now known that Wheeler's cavalry was between him and the rendezvous point. So McCook started back. The march began at midafternoon; excessive intervals between brigades prevented them from being mutually supporting. The rear brigade didn't leave Lovejoy's until late in the afternoon. They had gone less than two miles when they were attacked by Armstrong and cut off from the rest of the division. A vigorous counterattack drove off the Confederates momentarily, but some of their units managed to get into the column as it re­formed and hastened westward. These were ejected with difficulty, but kept jabbing at Croxton's flanks as he tried to catch up with the brigade ahead. As darkness deepened in the woods, there were frequent halts and considerable confusion. The men, who had had little or no sleep for two nights, began to doze off in the saddles. Weary horses, no longer urged forward, stopped. A few sleeping men would cause a whole regiment to halt, thinking everyone ahead had stopped. The entire divisional column became greatly attenu­ated. Officers were too drugged with weariness to supervise the march and keep the brigades in motion.

 A long packtrain of several hundred laden mules continually blocked the passage of Croxton's rear brigade. McCook sent his inspector general back from the head of the column to locate the trouble. He found the pack train halted and asleep. Shouted curses failed to wake the animals. The inspector drew his sword and started poking them. Mules came to life with loud snorts and other uncouth noises. With tails in the air, the whole train stampeded and went rushing down the road, scattering units ahead and strewing packs through the woods on either side. It was hard to straighten this out.

 WHEELER hadn't had any sleep either. But one would not have known this from his actions. Riding hard through the afternoon he had reached the Macon railroad about dark to discover that the Federals had been gone for two hours or more. Jackson was not in sight. But a message soon came from him proposing that Wheeler press the retreating Yankees from the rear while he, Jackson, dashed around to their front. Between them they might capture the whole of McCook's force. Wheeler agreed.

 About daylight on the 30th Wheeler overtook McCook's rear guard at Line Creek, nine miles west of Fayetteville. The enemy had burned the bridge, but after driving off the bluecoats Wheeler rebuilt it in an hour. As he continued the pursuit, he was con­stantly receiving accretions from units catching up, as well as from elements of Jackson's force that had gone astray. McCook on the other hand was losing men as he went along, from illness, wounds, exhaustion, and straggling.

 McCOOK found that Newnan, where he expected to find tempor­ary shelter, was occupied by Roddney's Confederate brigade. This unit had been prevented, by McCook's destruction of the rail­road, from moving to Atlanta to join Hood. McCook bypassed the town and struck the LaGrange road several miles below. Here he was brought to bay by Wheeler who, anticipating his move, had sent Ashby's brigade to head him off while Wheeler led his own force down between the railroad and the pike to strike him in rear. Jackson now began to come up on the flanks of McCook's some­what disorganized force.

 Croxton, commanding the 1st Brigade, found a strong defensive position in the edge of dense woods with an impassable ditch in front. Wheeler worked around to attack it in flank; but meanwhile McCook deployed his other brigades and was able, by vigorous counterattacks, to hold his position until late afternoon.

 Some of McCook's units were nearly out of ammunition, and both men and officers felt that they were surrounded. This was prac­tically true, but they might have found, by probes, that the en­circling line was paper thin at several places. Nevertheless McCook, after consulting his brigade commanders, decided to break out by letting each unit knife through wherever it liked, separating and fleeing in a sort of "every man for himself" operation. It is hard to understand why such a desperate measure was adopted instead of attempting the risky plan of assembling the whole force and punching through at one weak point. This was done successfully by a single regiment, the 8th Iowa, which bowled over Ross's Confederate brigade by capturing the latter's horses, assembled in the woods under horseholders, then capturing Ross and most of his brigade. Ross and his men were later rescued by Wheeler, but for a short time the 8th Iowa enjoyed a real triumph and in his re­port McCook blew it up into more importance than the final re­sult justified. Brig. Gen. Lawrence S. (Sul) Ross was a colorful young Texan (born in Iowa) who during his college vacation had fought Comanche Indians in 1859 under Van Dorn. He was too young to get a commission, so went back to graduate from college, then came into the Confederate Army as a private and worked his way up to brigadier general by the end of 1863. He was brave and skil­ful; after the war he was twice governor of Texas.

 McCook and fragments of several regiments broke out in a single group and got across the Chattahoochee at Philpot's Ferry, south of Franklin. Other elements charged through, then tore their way through briars and swamps until they reached the river above Franklin. Some of them swam their mounts across, others were aided by Negroes who furnished a few canoes. Many were captured at the river by Confederate cavalry, and still more after they crossed. Wheeler attempted a vigorous but apparently not well-organized pursuit; the Rebels were tired, too, and darkness came on to con­ceal the fleeing Federals. Most of McCook's men worked their way to Marietta, where the regiments were rebuilt. Wheeler thought he had destroyed McCook's division. For a time it was scattered and incapable of action, but with amazing recuperative power it soon was a respectable fighting force once more.

 STONEMAN on the other hand, met disaster. With three cavalry brigades under Colonels James Biddle, Silas Adams, and Horace Capron, some 2,100 men, he left Decatur at dawn on July 27. Privately, and contrary to Sherman's orders, he had determined to go directly to Andersonville via Macon to liberate the prisoners. He had no intention of rendezvousing with the other divisions, as. he had been told to do, nor of concentrating on breaking up the railroad, until he had brought back the prisoners-thus bringing great joy to millions in the North and fame to himself.

 He swung out well to the east so as to conceal his movement, going through Covington rather than McDonough, and pointedly failing to keep Garrard informed. His advance guard encountered hostile pickets seven miles north of Macon on the morning of the 30th and drove them slowly back to within a mile of the earthworks, protecting the city. These fortifications were garrisoned by Georgia militia and home guards under Maj. Gen. Howell Cobb. They stopped Stoneman, mostly with artillery fire. During the morning, while Stoneman was making "attacks" that really were only demon­strations, Capron's brigade, off to the east of the city, was burning bridges and boxcars on the Macon & Milledgeville Railroad. By 5 p.m. Stoneman had decided to bypass Macon and cross the river seven or eight miles downstream. One of his staff, who conferred with Stoneman at this time, wrote later that he got the distinct impression   that  Stoneman   felt   that  he   could   not   get   to  Anderson-ville, so  intended  to  flee  toward  Pensacola,  Florida.

 He actually had Adams' brigade on the way south around Macon when he received a report that a column of 1,800 enemy cavalry was riding into Macon to reinforce the garrison. The experience of veterans is that such reports are almost always false, or at least require verification; usually the "enemy cavalry" are country folk, about 10 percent as numerous as reported, seeking refuge within their own lines. But Stoneman, accepting the story at its face value, decided to retreat at once. His first inclination was to go toward Milledgeville, east of Macon. Finally he told his brigade commanders that they would march northward, whence they came. This was the weakest solution of all. A little reflection would have told Stoneman that all effective Confederate cavalry was with Hood, hence in that direction lay his greatest immediate danger. By now part or all of Wheeler's cavalry would be on his trail.

 BUT STONEMAN perversely was determined to face his division around and started toward Clinton, 15 miles to the north. Soon his leading brigade met advance elements of Iverson's force, which they pressed back slowly until 9 p.m., when they went into bivouac six miles north of Clinton. On the next morning, July 31, the re­treat continued until, eight miles north of Clinton, Stoneman's advance scouts encountered Iverson's whole command drawn up on a low ridge, astride the road.

 Instead of holding Iverson in place with long-range fire from a squadron or a regiment while slipping his main body by a covered route wide around either flank, Stoneman decided to butt his head right against Iverson's barricade. He did so and was re­pulsed. Then Iverson reciprocated. Well supported by a battery of artillery, the Confederates inflicted damage on Stoneman. The fighting see-sawed back and forth until 2 p.m., when Stoneman was told that other Confederates were coming up in his rear. Though these must have been militia from Macon, the news had a seriously-adverse effect on Stoneman. He continued to fight until 4 p.m., however, when he informed his brigade commanders that they were surrounded. With Biddle's brigade he would remain in place en­gaging the enemy while Capron and Adams might cut out and run if they liked. He would then surrender with Biddle's 500 men.

 Capron and Adams agreed. Biddle's comments were not recorded.

As they fled out to the flank, then north again, Capron and Adams heard the firing from Biddle's line until they were several miles distant. Stoneman later received much praise in certain quarters for his heroic self-sacrifice. While in captivity he sent Sherman a letter under a flag of truce, in which he said he pre­ferred to be in captivity "rather than amongst those who owe their escape to considerations of self-preservation." His noble 500, in pri­son camp with him involuntarily, felt otherwise.

 Adams and Capron took parallel routes northeastward, but kept in touch with each other. By dark they had put 35 miles between themselves and the battlefield. The next day they continued to­ward Athens, even stopping now and then to destroy enemy sup­plies. At Madison, Adams filled the air with the fragrance from several tons of bacon and coffee that he burned.

 ON THE NIGHT of August 2-3 these two brigades had nearly made their way back to their own lines when Capron was sur­prised in bivouac, and his brigade broken up with a substantial loss in men. This occurred near Jug Tavern, now Winder, the home of Senator Russell. Before daylight as the weary troopers-including the pickets-lay sound asleep, a Confederate cavalry force burst into the camp, jumping their horses over the prostrate Federals and overrunning the camp. The Yankees sprang up with arms in hand and started to defend themselves individually, when they were thrown into complete confusion by several hundred Negro refugees. These had followed them the night before and bivouacked nearby. Terrified by the sudden attack, the Negroes stampeded through the camp, producing an impressive uproar.

 Adams, who had camped 16 miles northeast of Lawrenceville, learned of this disaster, at a distance heard the noise and tried to rescue Capron's brigade, but was too late. He got back to the expedition's starting point with most of his men, but only remnants of Capron's brigade made their way back on foot. Since Biddle's brigade had been surrendered by Stoneman, the division was virtually wrecked, and had to be rebuilt.

 Garrard's division was unharmed, but had accomplished nothing. After Garrard was certain that he would not hear from either Stoneman or McCook, he marched his command northeast through

Livonia and around Stone Mountain; then turned west to Buckhead, six miles north of the center of Atlanta, where he went into camp.

 WHEN THE RESULTS of the raid were known at Hood's head­quarters there was great rejoicing, for the Southerners felt that Wheeler had won a decisive victory. Any fair-minded observer must agree. Wheeler had shown outstanding generalship under a severe test of his judgment, decisiveness, and vigor of execution.

Sherman in essence concurred. With unaccustomed restraint he merely commented, "On the whole the cavalry raid is not deemed a success." On the credit side, however, the Confederates had performed for him a real service by taking Stoneman out of circula­tion.

 WHILE SHERMAN'S cavalry was being reorganized after the Stoneman-McCook Raid, Kilpatrick's division was brought forward to cover the right flank, together with a newly ar­rived brigade under Col. Israel Garrard. McCook was sent to the rear, about Vining's Station, while Kenner Garrard remained covering the left flank.

 Hood decided to stage a raid, too, now that the Federal cavalry was supposedly too crippled to interfere. So he sent Wheeler to wreck the railroads from Nashville and Chatta­nooga. With eight brigades containing 4,000 men Wheeler moved out from Covington on August 10 and tore up track at Marietta, Cassville, and Calhoun. Continuing north, he threatened Dalton; then pushed on into Tennessee, burned a bridge over the Holston River, circled Knoxville, and damaged the railroad near McMinnville. Then turning southwest he attacked the Nashville-Decatur Railroad near Franklin, and was himself attacked by infantry under Rousseau, whom he defeated. After a month on the road he crossed the Tennes­see River near Tuscumbia and moved to rejoin Hood. Though he had caused the Federals considerable trouble, he failed to inflict any lasting damage on Sherman's supply lines. Actually the raid was beneficial to Sherman, who seized the opportunity, thus afforded by Wheeler's absence, to launch one final cavalry raid south of Atlanta.

 THE JOB was assigned to Brig. Gen. Hugh Judson Kil-Patrick, known by his men as "Kill Cavalry" Kilpatrick, a thin little raccoon-like man with scraggly red sidewhiskers. He was bold at times, ran like a rabbit at others. Sherman thought he was "a hell of a damned fool," but he would fight, and was quite active. Actually Sherman lacked anyone better to lead the raid.

 This raid had much the same mission as McCook's, namely, to destroy the railroad to Macon. With his own division rein­forced by two brigades, Kilpatrick marched from Sandtown on the evening of August 18 and that night tore up a section of the Alabama and West Point Railroad at Fairburn. Then he marched to Jonesboro and on the night of the 19th burned large quantities of stores there. On the 20th he had just started to rip up track near Lovejoy's when he was attacked by Southern infantry. There was heavy firing during the night. Jackson came up on the rear of Kilpatrick, who made a charge and broke through. He went on to the east, com­ing out at Decatur. He told Sherman that it would take the Confederates 10 days to repair the railroad, but the line was running again in two days. This convinced Sherman that his cavalry "could not or would not work hard enough to disable a railroad properly."

 That the cavalry of the western armies was capable of better performance is proved by its record later under James H. Wilson. Its prior failure in Sherman's army is an overlooked flaw in a campaign generally considered to be one of the most successful in military history.